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Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental
Resources: Judicial Interpretation or
Judicial Legislation?
INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 brought major revi-
sions to American bankruptcy law. 2 The 1970's also saw the
advent of significant federal' and state legislative action in re-
sponse to a growing environmental protection movement. 4 A
decade and a half later, state and federal regulatory agencies5
and the courts continue to shape environmental policy as they
implement and interpret those laws.
6
1 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (last
codified at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-151, 326 (West 1982)) [hereinafter the Bankruptcy Code].
2 Enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 culminated an eight year
Congressional effort at modernizing American bankruptcy law in the face of ever
expanding caseloads and an increasingly complex area of law. The first major revision
of bankruptcy law in over forty years, the 1978 Act superseded the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. The 1978 Act made fundamental changes in the substantive bankruptcy laws, the
administration of those laws, and the structure of the bankruptcy court system. See
generally Pasvogel, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-A Review and Comments, 3
U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L.J. 13 (1980); Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1979).
1 There is no comprehensive body of federal environmental law. Rather, the
policy is made up of many separate bodies of statutory law. See, e.g., National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-27 (1982)) [hereinafter NEPA]; Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)); Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 92 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§
1201-1328 (1982)) [hereinafter SMCRA] (while representative of federal environmental
statutes, the foregoing list is not exhaustive).
See L. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT 1 (1982).
For an in depth study of the relationship between the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and state environmental agencies, see The New Federalism in Environ-
mental Law: Taking Stock, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 15065-108 (Dec. 1982) (presen-
tations delivered at the Eleventh Annual ABA Standing Committee on Environmental
Law Conference on the Environment, May 7-8, 1982).
6 See L. WENNER, supra note 4, at 2.
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Recently, bankruptcy policy has conflicted sharply with en-
vironmental policy.7 The conflict has arisen when businesses are
confronted with massive environmental cleanup obligations which
they could never pay. To avoid this crippling liability, businesses
seek protection under the Bankruptcy Code.8 Courts are thus
confronted with reconciling one policy, seeking to protect the
environment at the expense of the bankrupt and its creditors,
with another, which seeks to protect the bankrupt and its cred-
itors at the environment's expense. 9 Several recent cases have
addressed this conflict. 0
One such case is Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection." In Midlantic, the United States
Supreme Court settled a conflict between the bankruptcy
trustee's federally authorized power to abandon burdened
property under Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code,' 2 and
the states' traditional police powers to protect public health
7 See Comment, Bankruptcy and Environmental Regulation: An Emerging Con-
flict, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. 10099 (Apr. 1983).
1 See id.; see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 405, 407-08 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983) (under the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. Section 362 (for the
relevant language of Section 362, see infra note 17) the bankrupt sought protection from
the liability it was facing in the thousands of asbestos lawsuits pending and expected to
be filed against it in the future).
I See Comment, supra note 7, at 1.
10 See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106
S. Ct. 755 (1986) (5-4 decision) (see infra text accompanying notes 27-61), aff'd, In re
Quanta Resources Corp. 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (New York), 739 F.2d 927 (New
Jersey) (739 F.2d 912 and 739 F.2d 927 were companion cases; to prevent confusion,
they hereinafter will be qualified respectively with the following designations: (New
York) and (New Jersey)); Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d
267 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a state injunction requiring a bankrupt to backfill and
reclaim its mine sites was not a "money judgment" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy
Code, thus, placing it within the statutory exception to the automatic stay provision
provided under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1984)); In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding that a state could not enforce upon debtor a judgment requiring him to clean
up industrial water pollution when it would have the effect of forcing him to pay a
money judgment, as he did not possess the means to personally clean up the waste),
aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) [hereinafter Kovacs II].
1 106 S. Ct. 755.
,2 11 U.S.C. § 554 (West 1984). Section 554 provides:
(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value and benefit to the estate.
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
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and safety.' 3
This Comment examines Midlantic in light of the abandon-
ment doctrine's history and statutory codification. In view of
the absolute terms of Section 554, and its lack of any significant
legislative history, the Comment suggests that the Midlantic Court
placed limitations on the trustee's abandonment power which
Congress never intended. The Comment examines the possible
consequences of Midlantic, and the trends developing among
bankruptcy courts in their application of the Supreme Court's
holding. Finally, the Comment suggests that the conflict between
environmental policy and Section 554 is settled more properly
through legislative action on the part of Congress and individual
state legislatures.
I. THE ABANDONMENT DOCTRINE
A fundamental purpose of the bankruptcy process is to
conserve the debtor's assets for an equitable and timely distri-
bution to the debtor's creditors.' 4 The bankruptcy court, exer-
cising the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty,"5
utilizes a variety of tools in furthering this goal. These tools,
court may order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to
the estate.
(c) Unless the court orders otherwise, any property scheduled under section
521(a)(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the time of the closing
of a case is abandoned to the debtor and administered for purposes of
section 350 of this title.
(d) Unless the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not
abandoned under this section and that is not administered in the case
remains property of the estate.
Id.
Id See generally Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 883-84 (Mo. 1962)
(providing a brief discussion of the state's exercise of police powers).
" See, e.g., In re McGoldrick, 121 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir. 1941) (citing with
approval the court's language in In re Ostlind Mfg. Co., 19 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Or.
1937)); In re Morrissey, 37 Bankr. 571, 573 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (citing 1 Bankr.-
L. Ed., Summary § 1.1, at 4-7 (1979)) ("The two major purposes of the Code are to
provide debtors with a 'fresh start' and to provide for the fair and equitable distribution
of assets to creditors.").
" 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (West 1982) provides: "A bankruptcy court shall have the
powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty, but may not enjoin another court or
punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the court or
warranting a punishment of imprisonment."
1987]
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inter alia, include dischargeability, 16 the automatic stay, I" the
discretionary stay,"s and abandonment.' 9
Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the trustee
in bankruptcy, after notice and a hearing, to abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome or of inconsequential
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982) (Subject only to the statutory exceptions of 11
U.S.C. § 523(a), this statute discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before
bankruptcy.). But cf. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (Kovacs II) (which has made
the law unclear as to the dischargeability in bankruptcy of state environmental obliga-
tions: "[f]inally, we do not question that anyone in possession of the site . . . must
comply with the [state's environmental laws]. Plainly, that person or firm may not
maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters ... or refuse to remove the source of such
conditions." Id. at 711-12.); Comment, Bankruptcy Law-Enforceability of State En-
vironmental Laws Against Bankrupt Debtors-Ohio v. Kovacs (In re Kovacs), 105 S.
Ct. 705 (1985), 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 417 (1985) (discussing the implications of Kovacs).
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1984), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a stay, applicable
to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation of process, of a judicial,
administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was or could
have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this
title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under
this title;
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . .
does not operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(l) of this section, of the commencement or
continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section of the enforcement of a
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or pro-
ceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police
or regulatory power.
Id. See generally Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays of Environmental Regulation: Harvest of
Commercial Timber as an Introduction to a Clash of Policies, 12 ENVTL. L. 1 (1981);
Comment, supra note 7.
" See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1984), which provides: "[the bankruptcy court may
issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]."
,9 See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (West 1984). See supra note 12 for the provisions of Section
554.
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value or benefit to the estate.2° Compelling the bankruptcy trustee
to administer burdensome property would slow the administra-
tion of the estate and drain its assets, frustrating the Bankruptcy
Code's fundamental purpose.
2'
Abandonment amounts to a complete divestiture from the
bankruptcy estate of all interests previously held in the prop-
erty. 22 In effect, the abandonment severs the burdened property,
with its accompanying liability, from the remaining assets of the
estate that might be applied to such liability. 23 Upon abandon-
ment, the property reverts to any person holding a possessory
interest therein. 24 This person is generally the debtor. 25 Lien-
holders may then proceed against the property under applicable
state laws as if the bankrupt had owned it continuously. 26 The
bankruptcy trustee may then settle the bankruptcy estate, unfet-
tered by the burdened property.
II. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) was in the business
of processing and reselling waste oil and oil sludge. 27 In June
- See 1I U.S.C. § 554(a) (West 1984). Bankruptcy Rule 6007 governs the procedure
for abandonment of property.
11 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755,
763 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr.
268, 270 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 554.01 (L. King
15th ed. 1985)) ("The underlying purpose of abandonment is to enable the trustee to
efficiently reduce the debtor's property to money for distribution to creditors.").
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 554.02[2], at 554-56 (L. King 15th ed. 1985).
23 M. Drablin, J. Moorman, & L. Kirsch, Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Haz-
ardous Waste: Caveat Creditor, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10168, 10172 (June
1985).
.' Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 n.12 (1985) (Kovacs II) (citing S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 92 (1978)) (addressing the abandonment of hazardous waste
sites).
23 See, e.g., Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602 (1937); Mason v. Commissioner,
646 F.2d 1309, 1310 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Tarpley, 4 Bankr. 145, 146 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1980).
6 In re Tarpley, 4 Bankr. at 146-47 (quoting In Re Polumbo, 271 F. Supp. 640,
644 (W.D. Va. 1967)).
27 In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927, 928 (3d Cir. 1984) (New Jersey)
(Quanta operated two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and another in
Edgewater, New Jersey.); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
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1981, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(NJDEP) discovered that Quanta's Edgewater, New Jersey proc-
essing facility had accepted over 400,000 gallons of waste oil
contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) 28 in viola-
tion of a specific prohibition in its operating permit. 29 In October
1981, Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.30 Subsequently, the action was con-
verted to a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7.31 After
unsuccessful attempts to sell Quanta's New Jersey and New York
processing facilities, the trustee32 notified Quanta's creditors and
the bankruptcy court that he intended to abandon the property
pursuant to Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
3
The bankruptcy court authorized abandonment of the prop-
erties over the objections of state and local authorities.3 4 The
106 S. Ct. 755, 757 (1986). In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, a party to this case,
provided Quanta Resources Corp. a $600,000 loan secured by Quanta's inventory,
accounts receivable, and certain equipment. Id. at 757.
' PCB's are hazardous chemicals. PCB's as well as their oxidation products
(produced when PCB's are burned) are extremely toxic carcinogens. In re Quanta
Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 913 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (New York).
29 Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 757. Subsequently it surfaced that the Long Island City
facility had accepted and stored over 70,000 gallons of PCB contaminated oil in dete-
riorating and leaking containers. Id. at 758.
30 Id. at 757.
31 Id.
" Thomas J. O'Neill was appointed trustee for the debtor. Id. at 757-58.
J Id. at 757. The trustee also proposed a Section 554 abandonment of the New
Jersey facility, including the contaminated oil, on April 23, 1983. Quanta Resources,
739 F.2d at 928 (New Jersey).
'" Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 758. The state of New York argued that abandonment
of the facility would create a continuing violation of state and local hazardous waste
storage laws, thereby creating a substantial danger to the public health and safety. Basing
its objection on public policy as reflected by local laws and the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
Section 959(b) (see infra note 56 and accompanying text), "New York requested that
permission to abandon be denied until all hazardous wastes were removed from the
property and lawfully disposed of." Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d at 914 (New York).
The bankruptcy court noted that the city and state were "in a better position in every
respect than either the Trustee or debtor's creditors to do what need[ed] to be done to
protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCB contaminated facility." Mid-
lantic, 106 S. Ct. at 758. NJDEP opposed the abandonment, arguing that New Jersey
law required that oil contaminated with PCB's be stored and disposed of in compliance
with state regulations. "[A]bandonment would contravene these requirements and pose
a threat to public health and safety because the oil was stored in leaking and insecure
tanks, creating a danger of spillage into the Hudson River." Quanta Resources, 739
F.2d at 928 (New Jersey). Finally NJDEP argued that the estate had sufficient funds to
meet the state's requirements. Id.
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New Jersey federal district court affirmed the abandonment of
Quanta's New York facility." The New York authorities subse-
quently appealed the judgment to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 6 NJDEP took direct appeal from
the bankruptcy court to the Third Circuit.
3 7
In companion opinions," a divided panel of the Third Circuit
reversed and remanded both cases.3 9 The court held that the
bankruptcy trustee's Section 554 power of abandonment did not
supersede the enforcement of state public health and safety
laws. 40 The court determined that Congress intended to codify
the abandonment practice developed by courts under the former
Bankruptcy Act. 41 Stating that certain public interests protected
by state law or general equitable principles were not overridden
by the "judge-made" abandonment power, the majority held
the same to be true of the codified abandonment provision.4 2
The Third Circuit cited additional provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code in support of its proposition that Congress intended to
preempt only those state regulations grounded on policies out-
weighed by the relevant federal interests. 43
Before the cases were reconsidered in the lower courts, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated
the cases." The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit, 45
11 Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 758.
36 Id.
11 Id. at 759. "Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New York
facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litigation consented to
NJDEP's taking a direct appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to § 405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978." Id. That section, as codified,
provides in pertinent part: "a court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of an appeal from
a final judgment, order, or decree of ... a bankruptcy court of the United States if
the parties to such appeal agree to a direct appeal to the court of appeals." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1293(b) (West 1986).
11 See Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 912 (New York); Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d
927 (New Jersey).
19 Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
, Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d at 929 (New Jersey).
" See infra text accompanying notes 65-67, regarding the "judge-made" abandon-
ment doctrine.
42 See Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
43 Id.
" Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 105 S. Ct. 1168
(1985) (Petition for writs of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit were granted, and the cases were combined.).
41 Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
1987]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY
prohibiting the trustee from abandoning the burdened property
of the bankruptcy estate. In a five to four opinion, the Supreme
Court held that "[t]he Bankruptcy Court does not have the
power to authorize an abandonmefit without formulating con-
ditions that will adequately protect the public's health and
safety." 46 Announcing the majority's opinion, Justice Powell
stated: "we hold that a trustee may not abandon property in
contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably
designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards."
47
Citing pre-Bankruptcy Code case law, 4 the majority stated
that Congress, in codifying the "judge-made" doctrine of aban-
donment, presumably included the corollary that a trustee could
not exercise his abandonment power in contravention of certain
legitimate state or federal interests. 4 9 The Court concluded that
" Id. at 762.
"1 Id. The Court qualified the exception in a footnote:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by § 554 is
a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future
violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment
power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated
to protect the public health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm.
Id. at 762-63 n.9.
" The Court cited Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952); In re
Chicago Rapid Transit, 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942);
In re Lewis Jones, Inc., I Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 227 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974). In
Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that a bankruptcy trustee who was liquidating the estate of a barge
company could not abandon several barges when such abandonment would result in
obstruction of navigable passages in violation of a federal statute. The Court held that
the "judge-made" abandonment rule had to give way to a "duty and burden imposed
on an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the public interest." Ottenheimer, 198
F.2d at 290.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit, 129 F.2d 1, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order authorizing the debtor railway
company to abandon the unexpired lease of a rail line. The court stated in dicta,
however, that the abandonment had to be continued to ensure compliance with state
law. Chicago Rapid Transit, 129 F.2d at 5. In In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 277, the bankruptcy court concluded that the principle of Ottenheimer, did
not apply because there was no conflicting statute. However, because the abandonment
power was based upon "judge-made" law, the court resorted to its equitable powers to
protect the public interest. The court required a trustee seeking abandonment to first
expend the assets of the estate to seal manholes and vents in an underground pipe
network. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
49 Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
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if Congress had intended to codify the doctrine without the
"well-recognized" restrictions on the trustee's abandonment
power, it clearly would have expressed that intent.5 0
The Court stated that Congress repeatedly had expressed its
intent that the Bankruptcy Code should not facilitate circumven-
tion of valid governmental interests.,, Illustrating this point, the
Court discussed the pre-Bankruptcy Code predecessors of the
Section 554 abandonment provision and the Section 362 auto-
matic stay provision.5 2 Reiterating that the exception to the
judicially developed abandonment power was firmly established
prior to the inception of Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the opinion stated that the exception was implicitly incorporated
within Section 554.53 By way of contrast, the opinion noted that
Congress had significantly broadened the scope of the automatic
stay doctrine with the enactment of Section 362 in 1978.14 There
being no previously well-established judicial limitations to these
expanded automatic stay powers, the Court reasoned that Con-
gress was compelled to provide them in the express language of
the statute. 5
The Midlantic Court stated that 28 U.S.C. Section 959(b)
5 6
provided further "evidence that Congress did not intend for the
10 See Id. at 759-60 (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 433
U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979)). The Midlantic Court stated, "[tlhe normal rule of statutory
construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific." Id. The Midlantic Court
continued:
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the
scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress wishes to grant the trustee
an extraordinary exemption from non-bankruptcy law, 'the intention would
be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of the bankrupt.'
Id. at 760 (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904)).
11 See id. at 760.
52 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1984). See supra note 17.
'3 Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 761.
Id. (citing 1 W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 20.03, at 5-6
(1981)).
11 Id. In countering the dissent, the majority uses this general argument to explain
the absence of any statutory language regarding exceptions to the abandonment power.
-' 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1978) provides:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager
appointed in avy case pending in any court of the United States, including
a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his
19871
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Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws." '5 7 The Court noted
that Section 959(b) commands the trustee to "manage and op-
erate [the debtor's] property . .. according to the requirements
of the valid laws of the State." '58
The Court also cited recent federal environmental legislation59
as evidence of a repeated congressional emphasis on the "goal
of protecting the environment against toxic pollution." ' 6 The
Court stated that it was unwilling, "[in the face of Congress'
undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and
disposal of hazardous and toxic substances," to presume that
Congress, by enacting Section 554, implicitly overturned the pre-
Code limitations on the abandonment power.
61
III. ANALYsIs
The Midlantic Court split over its interpretation of Section
554 of the Bankruptcy Code, the abandonment provision. The
majority carved an exception to a statute otherwise absolute in
its terms. The Court consequently shifted from the position of
tacit approval of unrestricted abandonment it had held a year
earlier. 62 The Court held that Congress codified the judicially
possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the require-
ments of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in
the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to
do if in possession thereof.
Id.
7 Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 761.
11 Id. The Court conceded that Section 959(b) does not directly apply to an
abandonment under Section 554, but the court concluded that Section 959(b) reveals
that "Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws that
otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers." Id. at 762.
19 Id. at 762. The Court discussed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-57 (West 1985) (RCRA).
6 Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 762.
61 Id.
u See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 n. 12 (1984). Discussing the administration
of burdensome property, the Kovacs Court stated in dictum:
If the site at issue were [the debtor's] property, the trustee would shortly
determine whether it was of value to the estate. If the property was worth
more than the costs of bringing it into compliance with state law, the
trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net value, and the buyer would
clean up the property, in which event whatever obligation [the debtor]
might have had to clean up the property would have been satisfied. If the
ABANDONMENT OF HAZARDOuS WASTE
developed doctrine of abandonment, presumably including "well-
recognized" restrictions on that power. 63 Justice Rehnquist, in a
well-reasoned dissent, stated that the majority's finding "rests
on a misreading of three pre-Code cases, the elevation of that
misreading into a 'well-recognized' exception to the abandon-
ment power, and the unsupported assertion that Congress must
have meant to codify the exception (or something like it)."
The power of abandonment was incorporated into bank-
ruptcy legislation for the first time with the enactment of Section
554. 61 Prior to Section 554, the courts had developed an aban-
donment doctrine analogous to the bankruptcy trustee's power
to reject executory contracts.6 The judicial doctrine permitted
the bankruptcy trustee to abandon worthless or overburdened
property when its encumbrances and costs of administration
exceeded the price that could be expected in a sale of the prop-
erty. 6
7
The majority in Midlantic stated that the statutory abandon-
ment power is limited by a judicially developed doctrine designed
to protect legitimate state or federal interests. 68 The dissent in
Midlantic stated that there never existed a well-recognized judi-
cial limitation to the power of abandonment. 69
The Midlantic Court appears to have been straining to find
a "well-recognized" limit to the trustee's abandonment power
from three isolated cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker,70 a con-
flict existed between the "judge-made" abandonment rule and
property were worth less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee would likely
abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with the state
environmental law to the extent of his or its ability.
Id.
63 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755,
759 (1986).
" Id. at 763 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65 COLLIER, supra note 21, at 1 554-5.
" Id. at 554-2.
65 Id.; see, e.g., American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U.S. 288 (1884); Stanolind Oil
& Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763 (1938), 303
U.S. 636 (1938); Central States Life Ins. Co. v. Koplar Co., 80 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1935),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 687 (1936); In re Yalden, 109 F. Supp. 603 (D. Mass. 1953).
Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759 (1986).
19 Id. at 765 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952) (see supra note 48 for a summary of the case).
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a federal statute. The judicially developed abandonment doctrine
was subordinated to "an Act of Congress in the public inter-
est."'" In contrast, the Midlantic case involved a conflict between
public policy as reflected by the federal abandonment statute,
and the uncertain commands of state hazardous waste laws that
the majority in Midlantic declined to identify.
72
The Midlantic Court cited In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co. ,3
but did not rely on the holding of the case, which had allowed
abandonment. The Court relied solely on dicta from Chicago
Rapid Transit which supported some limitations on the trustee's
power of abandonment.
74
In In re Lewis Jones, Inc. ,7 the bankruptcy court subordi-
nated the "judge-made" abandonment power to the public in-
terest by requiring the trustee to spend the bankruptcy estate's
funds to seal underground steam lines before abandoning them.
7 6
As in Ottenheimer, this case turned on the judge-made nature
of the abandonment power rather than a specific federal aban-
donment statute such as existed in Midlantic.
77
Notwithstanding the Court's conclusion regarding the exist-
ence of a "well-recognized" exception to the pre-Code abandon-
ment doctrine, the import of that conclusion should be rendered
moot by the absolute, unqualified language of Section 554.7s In
7 Id. at 290.
See Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 764 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
Rehnquist considered the court of appeals' heavy reliance on the "judge-made" nature
of the pre-Code law of abandonment. He questioned whether the Ottenheimer Court
would have decided its case the same way under the present Bankruptcy Code. Id. at
764-65.
73 129 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1942). See supra note 48 for a summary of the case. In
Chicago Rapid Transit the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's authorization of abandonment. Id. at 8.
74 See Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759. In Chicago Rapid Transit the Seventh Circuit
allowed the trustee of a bankrupt railroad to abandon a burdensome lease, but cautioned
in dicta that the bankruptcy court could not regulate an intrastate public utility or
interfere with the state's regulation thereof. Chicago Rapid Transit, 129 F.2d at 5.
7, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 277 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See supra note 48 for a summary
of the case.
76 See Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759.
- Id. at 765 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition Justice Rehnquist stated,
"[m]oreover, I do not believe that the isolated decision of a single bankruptcy court
rises to the level of 'established law' that we can fairly assume Congress intended to
incorporate." Id.
71 See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 923-24 (3rd Cir. 1984) (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting) (New York).
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statutory construction, the statute's meaning must first be viewed
in the context of its plain language. 79 If the language is plain
and admits of no more than one meaning, the court's duty of
interpretation does not arise, and the rules used to interpret
doubtful meanings bear no discussion. 80
Notwithstanding the absolute language of Section 554, the
Supreme Court was not convinced that its task was complete.
The Court held that Congress implicitly incorporated the "police
power" exception into Section 554.81 The scant legislative history
of Section 554 provides virtually no help in gleaning Congress'
intent. 82 Discussing the use of legislative history as a tool of
analysis, the Court recently reiterated: "only the most extraor-
dinary showing of contrary intentions from [the statute's legis-
lative history] would justify a limitation on the 'plain meaning'
of the statutory language. When we find the terms of a statute
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in rare and
exceptional circumstances. '"83
The Supreme Court apparently found in the plain language
of Section 554, a "rare and exceptional case." The Court stated
that Congress' failure to elaborate reflected its intent to codify
prior abandonment case law which forbade the trustee to aban-
don property in violation of certain state and federal laws.8 4 The
Court held:
The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress
intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judi-
cially created concept, it makes that intent specific .... If
Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemp-
tion from non-bankruptcy law, 'the intention would be clearly
expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of
the bankrupt.' 5
E.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
E.g., id. (citing Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899)).
Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759-60.
See Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d at 916 (New York) ("There is no legislative
history of section 554.").
11 Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
187 n.33 (1978)).
Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759-60.
Id. at 759-60 (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S.
256, 266-67 (1979), and quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904)).
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The Supreme Court, following the Third Circuit's lead, cited
11 U.S.C. Section 362 for the proposition that Congress did not
intend for the Bankruptcy Code to abrogate enforcement of
state police power regulations.8 6 That Congress chose to enu-
merate certain exceptions to Section 362, while not similarly
expressly qualifying Section 554, weakens the majority's posi-
tion. Surely it is no accident that Section 554 is among the few
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code containing no explicit excep-
tions.87 As Section 362 indicates, Congress knows how to draft
exceptions allowing the exercise of certain police powers."'
The Court further bolstered its holding by discussing 28
U.S.C. Section 959(b),8 9 and recent federal environmental legis-
lation. 90 Section 959(b) requires the bankruptcy trustee to "man-
age and operate" the properties of the estate "according to the
requirements of the valid laws of the State" wherein such prop-
erty is situated. 91 While conceding that Section 959(b) was not
directly applicable to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, the
Court relied upon that section as evidence that Congress did not
intend the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. 92 The
Court offered existing environmental legislation as "additional
support" for restriction of the abandonment power.93 The Court's
discussion of Section 959(b) and the environmental legislation,
in light of their inapplicability to Section 554, would appear to
be "little more than a make-weight." 94
" Id. at 760-61. "One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to discard a well-established judicial
restriction on the abandonment power."Id at 760; see Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d at
918-19 (New York).
" See Note, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code by Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 870, 883 (1985) (addressing the
qualifications that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals read into § 554 in Quanta
Resources).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), (5) (1984); 11 U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2) (1984) (permitting
the abandonment of railway lines only if "consistent with the public interest"); see also
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23 (1984) ("[o]bviously, Congress knew
how to draft [exceptions] ... when it wanted to .... ).
- Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. 755, 761-62 (1986). See supra notes 56-57 and accompa-
nying text.
I Id. at 762. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
91 Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 761.
See id. at 762.
93 Id.
" See id. at 764-65 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONSEQUENCES
The Supreme Court in Midlantic changed the nature of the
notice and hearing requirement of Section 554.95 Formerly, in-
quiry under Section 554, focused solely on the property's value
to the bankruptcy estate.9 Under Midlantic the hearings establish
the priority of particular claims against the bankruptcy estate.
97
Congress probably never intended for Section 554 to prioritize
claims .98
A literal reading of Midlantic would bar a trustee from
abandoning any property if the abandonment violated a state
law designed to protect the public health or safety. 99 Prohibiting
the trustee from exercising his power to abandon burdensome
property effectively forces a cleanup on the bankruptcy estate.1°°
If disposal of the burdened property is conditioned upon cleanup,
the expenses of such an operation are classified as an adminis-
trative expense.' 0 The bankruptcy trustee may recover such ad-
ministrative expenses from the bankruptcy estate' 2 and from
91 See supra note 12 for the provisions of § 554.
Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 763-64 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 767-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See id. at 768 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 271 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(4), (5) (1984); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl.
Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1984) (holding that the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania's Commonwealth Court injunction against a debtor to correct violations of state
environmental protection statutes was exempt from automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §
362, thereby requiring compliance).
, Cf. In re T. P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 286-87 (Bankr. N. D. Ohio
1985) (holding that expenses incurred by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (E.P.A.) in removing a hazardous material, pursuant to its authority under the
Comprehensive Environmental, Responses, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), were entitled to administrative expense priority as an actual, necessary cost
of preserving the estate); In re Vermont Real Estate Trust, 45 Bankr. 804, 805 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1982) (expenses incurred in removing dangerous building from debtor's leasehold
treated as administrative expense).
-- See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503 (b)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1987). Section 503 (b)(1)(A)
provides in pertinent part: "(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed
administrative expenses . . . including-(l)(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses
of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered
after the commencement of the case. Id. See also COLLIER, supra note 21, 1 503.04
[l][a][i], at 503-18 to 503-23.
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property encumbered by secured creditors' claims. 1°3 The gov-
ernment's financial interests are thereby placed ahead of the
claims of the bankrupt's creditors.' l°
In many circumstances, strict compliance with state environ-
mental laws as contemplated under a literal reading of Midlantic
would be neither practical nor possible. A Chapter 7 no-asset
estate presents such a situation. 10 On the one hand, the trustee
would have no assets to finance the hazardous waste cleanup.
On the other hand, the court could not authorize abandonment
under Section 554(a) if it would violate state environmental
laws. 0 6 Ironically, such property would ultimately be abandoned
by default pursuant to Section 554(c).' 0 7 Thus, a strict application
of Midlantic merely sidesteps the underlying problem. 08
The potential instance of a statute requiring a long-term post-
closure monitoring plan, when the estate is without sufficient
funds to finance such a plan, underscores the impracticality of
strict compliance with state environmental laws. 0 9 A literal read-
ing of Midlantic in such a situation "could create a bankruptcy
case in perpetuity and fetter the estate to a situation without
resolve .... To pre-empt the administration of [such an] estate
would derogate the spirit and purpose of the bankruptcy laws
requiring prompt and effectual administration within a limited
time period."" 0
Justice Rehnquist, in his otherwise stinging dissent, suggested
that he would reserve a narrow exception to the trustee's power
,03 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1980). Section 506(c) provides: "The trustee may recover
from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to
the holder of such claim." Id. See also COLLER, supra note 22, at 506-53 to 506-64.
IN Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 767-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105 Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 272 n.5.
Im6 Id.
07 Id.; Section 554(c) provides in pertinent part: "any property scheduled under
Section 521(a)(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the time of the closing of a
case is abandoned to the debtor and administered for purposes of Section 350 of this
title." 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (West 1984).
108 Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. at 272 n.5.
I See In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986)
(the bankruptcy court was confronted with just such a dilemna. See infra text accompanying
notes 11-24.
11 Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. at 565.
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of abandonment for those situations "where abandonment by
the trustee itself might create a genuine emergency that the
trustee would be uniquely able to guard against.""' The bank-
ruptcy courts are developing a trend against a literal reading of
Midlantic, and applying the narrow exception espoused by Jus-
tice Rehnquist in his dissent.' These courts are distinguishing
their cases from the dangerous circumstances surrounding the
property involved in Midlantic, and applying a narrow reading
of Midlantic which would bar abandonment only under immi-
nently dangerous circumstances." 3 Two bankruptcy courts have
refused to apply a literal reading of Midlantic in cases with facts
very similar to those in Midlantic."1
4
A. In re Oklahoma Refining Co.
In In re Oklahoma Refining Co.,"' the bankruptcy trustee
moved for an order permitting abandonment of contaminated
real estate surrounding and underlying the bankrupt's refinery. " 6
Arguing that abandonment would violate state laws designed to
protect public health and safety, and the rule announced in
Midlantic, the Oklahoma Water Resources Board and the Okla-
homa State Department of Health opposed the abandonment
motion. "17
" Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 767 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing brief of the United
States as amicus curiae: "there are limits on the authority of a trustee to abandon
dynamite sitting on a furnace in the basement of a schoolhouse").
"I See Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. at 565-66 (see infra notes 107-18 and
accompanying text). The Franklin Signal Corp. Court stated:
Read literally, the Supreme Court's decison in Midlantic would bar a trustee
from abandoning any property if the abandonment would violate a state
law designed to protect the public health and safety. However, I do not
believe that this strict reading of the Court's decision is a desirable result
or, in fact, what the majority intended to hold.
Id. at 271.
" See Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. at 565. (The Court made a comparison
of the facts in its case with those of Midlantic, and concluded that the circumstances of
its case did "not present immediate and menacing harm to [the] public health and
safety."); Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. at 273-74.
"I See Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (see infra notes 115-26 and accom-
panying text); Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268 (see infra notes 127-39 and accom-
panying text).
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The bankruptcy trustee estimated that the cleanup would
cost a minimum of $2.5 million and require up to thirty years
of monitoring and additional cleanup. 118 The bankruptcy estate
had claims, secured and unsecured, totaling $48 million against
assets valued at approximately $4 million.1 9 Oklahoma law pro-
vided that before abandonment could occur, the owner had to
have an approved plan for long-term clean-up, maintenance, and
monitoring. 20 In addition the owner had to provide financial
assurances that the plan would be carried out.'
2'
The Oklahoma Refining court examined the facts of Midlan-
tic and held that the exception to the abandonment power should
be narrowly construed to apply only to extraordinary situations
like Midlantic.122 The Oklahoma Refining court held that "Mid-
lantic requires the bankruptcy court, in determining whether to
permit abandonment, take [sic] state environmental laws and
regulations into consideration. ' '12 The bankruptcy court author-
ized abandonment upon finding: (1) that there was no imminent
danger to the public,' 24 (2) that the trustee had acted reasonably
in mitigating the problem,' 25 and (3) that literal application of
Midlantic was impractical. 126
B. In re Franklin Signal Corp.
The bankruptcy trustee moved for abandonment, under Sec-
tion 554, of fourteen drums of various chemicals' 27 in In re
Franklin Signal Corporation.28 The bankruptcy estate faced
" Id. at 564.
I' d. at 563.
1I Id. at 564.
1Id.
122 Oklahoma Refining Co., at 565. These situations included immediate and men-
acing harm to public health and safety, aggravation of the existing condition, creation
or increase in the likelihood of a disaster, or intensification of polluting agents. Id.
123 Id.
'I Id.
1I Id. at 563.
126 Id. at 565-66.
I" An investigation revealed that the drums contained several different chemicals,
including: soldering oil and flux, hydroxyacetic acid, thinner, and trichlorothene. Trich-
lorothene constituted a hazardous waste under Wisconsin law. Franklin Signal Corp.,
65 Bankr. at 269.
1w Id.
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claims and administrative expenses well in excess of its assets. 29
The trustee estimated the cost of removing the hazardous wastes
at $20,000.3o
The bankruptcy court determined that the Midlantic Court
had been addressing the Midlantic trustee's total disregard for
potential hazards.' The bankruptcy court surmised that "the
Supreme Court intended only to place limits on a trustee's power
of abandonment by holding that the bankruptcy court cannot
authorize the abandonment of property in contravention of state
law unless conditions are formulated that will adequately protect
the public health and safety. 32 Accordingly, the bankruptcy
court found that the trustee was required only to "take adequate
precautionary measures to ensure that there [was] no imminent
danger to the public as a result of abandonment."' 33
The Franklin Signal court reasoned that a case-by-case ap-
proach provided a more feasible solution to the underlying prob-
lem than a literal reading of Midlantic.34 The bankruptcy court
listed five factors that should be considered when a bankruptcy
trustee proposes abandonment of hazardous wastes: "(1) the
imminence of danger to the public health and safety, (2) the
extent of probable harm, (3) the amount and type of hazardous
waste, (4) the cost to bring the property into compliance with
1' After the trustee liquidated available assets and distributed the proceeds to the
debtor's secured creditor, the remainder of the estate consisted of approximately $10,000
in unencumbered cash, the fourteen drums of waste, and two uncollectible promissory
notes for $75,000 from the debtor's officers. There were $17,652 in administrative
expenses. Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 270.
3 See id. at 271. The opinion quoted from Midlantic:
The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to reduce
imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs,
sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover, the
trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing dangers by
halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire.
The 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in un-
guarded, deteriorating containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contam-
ination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury,
genetic damage, or death through personal contact.
Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 758 n.3 (citations omitted).
,31 Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. at 271 (emphasis in original) (citations omit-
ted).
3 Id. at 272.
134 Id.
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environmental laws, and (5) the amount and types of funds
available for cleanup."'3 The Franklin Signal court reasoned
that consideration of "these factors in setting the conditions for
abandonment [would] effectively balance the competing inter-
ests."1
36
Applying this approach to Franklin Signal, the bankruptcy
court allowed abandonment of the drums, notwithstanding con-
travention of Wisconsin environmental laws. 137 The trustee had
commissioned a study of the barrels and their contents which
disclosed that there was no imminent danger to the public
safety. 3 ' 'By notifying the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources, the trustee met the minimum conditions for aban-
donment under the Franklin Signal court's narrow reading of
Midlantic.3 9
V. PROPOSALS
Although the Midlantic Court did not expressly address it, 14
an underlying theme of the Quanta/Midlantic litigation was the
concern that abandoned hazardous waste sites would become
governmental burdens by default. 14 ' In its zeal to prevent such
a result, the Supreme Court artfully rationalized and framed an
exception to the abandonment provision which Congress prob-
ably never intended.
The conflict between Section 554 and environmental policy
should be resolved by legislative action. A balance should be
' Id.
,36 Id.
"' See id. at 274.
,' Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. at 273.
19 Id.
110 The Midlantic Court stated in a footnote:
The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may abandon
property under § 554, in contravention of local laws designed to protect
the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its
expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, however, like
the question of the ultimate disposition 'of the property, is not before us.
Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 758 n.2.
"I See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 912, 921 (3rd Cir. 1984) (New
York); see also Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 767 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "What the
Court fails to appreciate is that respondents' interest in these cases lies not just in
protecting public health and safety but also in protecting the public fisc." Id.
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struck between governmental, financial, and environmental con-
cerns and the rights of creditors.
Any exception to the trustee's abandonment power under
Section 554 should be provided by Congress in express statutory
language. Additionally, as Justice O'Connor expressed in her
concurring opinion in Ohio v. Kovacs, 42 the states possess the
power to correct the conflict. Property rights in the assets of a
bankrupt's estate are generally determined by state law. 143 There-
fore, "the classification of [a state's] interest as either a lien on
the property itself, a perfected security interest, or merely an
unsecured claim depends on [state] law."'" This classification
generally determines the priority of the state's claim to the
estate's assets relative to other creditors. 45 Thus, a state may
protect its interest in enforcing its environmental laws by giving
cleanup judgments the status of statutory liens or perfected
secured claims.'" Under such a framework, creditors entering
into risky transactions with possible hazardous waste violators
would be forewarned of the possible consequences.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Mid-
lantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection
creates an exception to Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Court's holding in Midlantic, in light of Section 554's
unqualified, absolute language, and legislative history, smacks
of judicial legislation. Under a literal reading of Midlantic, a
trustee in bankruptcy could no longer abandon burdensome
property in contravention of a state's statutes or regulations
designed to protect the public health or safety.
Although it was not initially clear how Midlantic would
affect bankrupts, creditors, bankruptcy trustees or states, the
bankruptcy courts are providing answers in their application of
Midlantic. A trend is developing among bankruptcy courts to
142 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143 Id.
' Id.
Id. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 545 (West 1984) (trustee may avoid statutory liens only in
specified circumstances).
1 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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apply the Midlantic exception only in extreme circumstances of
imminent danger to the public health and safety. 47 This narrow
reading represents a more rational application of Midlantic than
would a strict reading, which would frustrate the fundamental
goals of the Bankruptcy Code.'
4
1
The Bankruptcy Code's abandonment provision arguably may
be flawed as it sometimes undermines enforcement of environ-
mental laws. However, as Midlantic reveals, the courts are not
the proper forum for correcting the problem. The conflict be-
tween the Section 554 abandonment provision and the public's
environmental interests compels a legislative response that bal-
ances environmental and creditor interests. Midlantic should be
the catalyst for such a response.
John Bell Whitesell
" See supra notes 111-39 and accompanying text.
, See In re Franklin Supply Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
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